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TPFNTIFTCATION OF THF PARTIES 
Appellant is K & T, Inc. dba Budget Rent-a-Car, re lured ... herein as "Budget." 
Nonparty Manuel Dcano Ilerrera is referred to as "Ilerrera" and nonparty DI,SS, 
Inc. is referred to as "DLSS." 
mxRmimiiiiiN 
This case is about one w ord "'belonging." In Budget's previous case against 
DLSS, the trial court ruled the credit card "belonged" to Herrera. In doing so, the court 
strains the interpretation of the word to argue that Herrera owned the card. Further, 
Voweil argues that because Herrera allegedly owned the card, Voweil cannot be made to 
:•• - • (• : l DW ^  'rei , botl 11 lei i era ai id (,|> " :H veil v > ei e 
v,.vwgors of the card. *li an nidi\ idu~i . . . . oluntarily allows another to use his or her credit 
card, the cardholder has authorized the use of that card and is thereby responsible for any 
charge I i I \ i^/t/i.w A' I'siwy ^ \ f I U ih I >. h i li at dial .1 "jiiil^iiicnt 
against one or more of several obligors ... shall not discharge a co-obligor who was not a 
party to the proceeding where judgment was rendered." I ITAH C O D E A N N . § 15-4-2. 
Here, (| o\ v ell ai ill i :n, ized I lei rei a tc i lse \ ' o1 ;:l* ell' s ere dit • :ard on be 1: lalf of DI SS. 
Budget's judgment against DLSS in no way relieves Voweil of his obligation to honor the 
charges he authorized. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DISREGARD PARAGRAPHS 2 
THROUGH 6 OF THE APPELLATE BRIEF 
Vowell argues the Court should disregard paragraphs 2 through 6 of Budget's 
statement of facts in its appellate brief, alleging the facts are unsupported by the record. 
However, paragraphs 2 through 6 of Budget's appellate brief contain the same factual 
allegations contained in Budget's complaint against Vowell (the "Complaint"), attached 
as Addendum "A" to the appellate brief. Specifically, support for paragraphs 2 through 6 
of the appellate brief is found in paragraphs 8 through 13 of the Complaint. Because this 
is an appeal from the district court's order granting Vowell's motion to dismiss, the Court 
must accept the factual allegations in the Complaint, as reiterated in the appellate brief, as 
true, and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to 
plaintiff. See Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, /nc, 909 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Utah 
1996). 
Vowell also objects to the information contained in Addendum "C" to the 
appellate brief, which is a record of conversations between Vowell and American 
Express, in which Vowell identifies himself as a "silent officer" and "joint owner" of 
DLSS. Again, this appeal is of an order granting Vowell's motion to dismiss. Vowell's 
objection serves to underscore that there has been limited factual development of the case. 
Budget did not have the opportunity to enter into extensive discovery with Vowell before 
the case was dismissed. For that reason, the lower court record is indeed sparse. 
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Budget's Addendum "C" shows only that there are factual issues that have not been, and 
which need to be, explored. 
II. UTAH LAW SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZES LAWSUITS AGAINST 
CO-OBLIGORS WHERE JUDGMENT AGAINST AN OBLIGOR HAS 
ALREADY BEEN ENTERED 
The theme of Vowell's argiments is that because Budget has already obtained a 
judgment against DLSS for the debts incurred on the credit card, Vowell is relieved from 
his obligation for the debt. However, Utah law clearly contemplates that even where 
judgment is obtained against one obligor of an obligation, such judgment does not 
preclude seeking recovery from a co-obligor. "A judgment against one or more of several 
obligors ... shall not discharge a co-obligor who was not a party to the proceeding where 
the judgment was rendered." UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-4-2. The evidence submitted in the 
case against DLSS and the limited evidence discovered in the present matter clearly show 
that Vowell was an obligor for the credit card at issue. He is listed as a the "cardmember" 
on American Express's invoices. See American Express Invoice, submitted in the 
previous action as "Plaintiffs Exhibit 6," attached hereto as Addendum "A." 
III. BUDGET'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY ISSUE PRECLUSION 
The first element necessary for successfully asserting issue preclusion is the issue 
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant 
action. See Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 847 (Utah 2004). Although Vowell argues 
the issues litigated in Budget's action against DLSS are identical to the ones asserted 
here, this is not true. In Budget's action against DLSS, the issue presented for the court's 
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consideration was whether the contracts DLLS entered into with Budget were 
enforceable. The court found they were. Here, the issue presented for the court's 
consideration is whether Vowell is obligated to answer for the debt of DLSS. 
Further, in order to successfully assert issue preclusion, Vowell must show that the 
issue in the first action was completely, fully and fairly litigated. Id. Two central issues 
in Budget's action against Vowell were not fully litigated in Budget's action against 
DLSS: (1) whether Vowell is obligated to answer for the debts of DLSS, as discussed 
above; and (2) whether the American Express Credit Card at issue is owned by Vowell. 
In his brief, Vowell argues the court's statement in the previous case that the credit card 
"belongs to DLLS" is conclusive proof that the issue was completely, fully and fairly 
litigated. See Brief of Appellee ("Vowell's Brief), p. 10. However, the issue of 
ownership of the credit card was not litigated as part of that case except to the extent to 
show that DLSS exercised control of and authority to use the credit card. Ultimate 
ownership of the card was not fully and fairly litigated. Although Vowell may see no 
distinction between "ownership" and "belonging," the distinction is significant in this 
case - the previous court only determined that Vowell had authorization to use the credit 
card, but did not determine ultimate ownership of the card. 
Vowell's insistence on a rigid interpretation and enforcement of the court's statement 
is the type of formalism rejected by Justice Cardozo in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 
118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1914). There, where the defendant insisted on a rigid interpretation 
and enforcement of a contract, Justice Cardozo noted, "The law has outgrown its 
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primitive style of formalism where the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and 
every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view today." Id. Despite the court's statement 
that the card "belongs" to DLSS, the issue of ownership of the credit card and, more 
broadly, the issue of Vowell's obligation to answer for the debt of DLSS, were never 
litigated. 
IV. BUDGET'S ACTION AGAINST VOWELL IS NOT PRECLUDED BY 
CLAIM PRECLUSION 
Vowell argues the elements of claim preclusion are met. Claim preclusion "bars a 
party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim that has been fully litigated 
previously." Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678, 686 
(Utah 2005). As argued above, Budget's claim that Vowell is responsible for the debt of 
DLSS was not previously litigated at all, let alone fully litigated. 
Vowell complains "he was not a party to the prior action, did not get to conduct 
discovery, did not get to review evidence, etc." Vowell's Brief, p. 12. However, Vowell 
is not precluded in the present action from questioning witnesses, including Herrera, 
conducting discovery and reviewing evidence. Vowell is not precluded in the present 
action from asserting defenses based upon an alleged lack of authorization for the use of 
the credit card. In short, Vowell will be permitted his day in court. 
Vowell also argues Budget's claims against him were "available" in the action against 
DLSS and should have been brought there. However, Budget's attempt to obtain 
satisfaction from the corporate debtor before pursuing Vowell does not serve as a waiver 
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of its claims against Vowell. 
V, BUDGET'S ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE 
TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES 
Vowell argues he cannot be ordered to answer for the debt of another without being 
given the opportunity to contest the underlying debt. Vowell does not cite to any relevant 
legal authority to support his argument. Even so, nothing in the Complaint against 
Vowell precludes Vowell from disputing not only his liability to answer for the debt of 
DLSS, but the debt itself. Budget has not claimed the judgment against DLSS has any 
preclusive effect on Vowell. 
Vowell also argues he will need both Herrera and DLSS and co-defendants in the 
present action in order to defend himself. See Vowell's Brief, p. 16. Vowell does not 
explain why he needs Herrera and DLSS as co-defendants. If Vowell needs testimony or 
other evidence from them, he may call them as witnesses or subpoena any necessary 
information. If he feels strongly that they should be parties, he may bring them in as third 
parties pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 14(a). 
Vowell is also concerned that a failure to join Herrera and DLSS as parties raises the 
risk of incurring inconsistent obligations. See Vowell's Brief, p. 17. There is no risk of 
inconsistent obligations. If Vowell is held liable to answer for the debt of DLSS, or even 
if he is not, the result will not be inconsistent with Judge Dever's finding that DLSS is 
responsible for the debt. 
Finally, if it's true, as Vowell alleges, that Herrrera and DLSS are indispensable 
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parties, the proper remedy is to order that they be joined, rather than dismiss the action in 
its entirety. Vowell has jumped to the conclusion that the lower court in this case must 
either proceed without DLSS or dismiss the case. Vowell has not shown why DLSS and 
Herrera are indispensable. Further, he has not shown why, even if they are indispensable, 
they cannot be joined to the present action. Thus, the lower court committed error by 
failing to give Budget the opportunity to join parties it considered indispensable. 
Conclusion 
The lower court's decision to grant Vowell's motion to dismiss should be reversed 
because: (1) Utah statute specifically allows a subsequent suit against an obligor where a 
judgment has already been entered against his co-obligor; (2) Budget's claims are not 
precluded by either issue preclusion or claim preclusion; (3) Budget did not fail to join 
indispensable parties; and (4) even if Budget failed to join indispensable parties, the 
correct remedy is to order the joinder of those parties, rather than dismiss the case. 
DATED this p |Q day of December, 2007. 
WINDER & HALSAM, P.C. 
DONALD J. W I D E R 
LANCE F. SORENSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff K & T, Inc. d/b/a Budget 
Rent-A-Car 
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ADDENDUM A 
Page I 
Serrleot 
Chargeback Keport 
Friday, December 27 2002 11:33:48 AM 
Chargeback Period: 12/01/2002 through 12/27/2002 
Chargeback Statue 
Total no.of new chargebacks: 
Total no.of viewed chargebacks 
Total no.of sent chargebacks: 
Total no.of no reply: 
Total no.of others: 
Total: 
Chargeback Summary Report For 5433910213 
No.of Total Chargeback 
chargebacks Amount 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
($105,774.21) 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
($105.774.21) 
Average Chargeback 
Amount 
($35,256.07) 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 | 
$0.00 
($35,258.07) 
Chargeback dataila for merchant #: 5433910213 
Location 
BUDGEfcEMTACAA 
aUOGE RENTACAR 
SUDGE RENTACAR 
ttorchont Statu* Chonjo 
Numbof Doto 
5433910213 Now 02/OSV20Q2 
S433S10213 Now 03/01/2002 
3433O10213 NOW 10/030002 
Origin* Cofdmombor 
Numoor 
3727111S1S43012 
3727111S1S43012 
37*5197S77S1007 
Location Total: 
Location:BUDGE RENT A CAR 
cojfflmomDor 
to66LW>KELL 
TOOOLVOWEUL 
KENT LEWS FOfttlFBER 
Cnorgoaock 
Do* 
12/24/2002 
12/24/2002 
12/00/2002 
Amount 
(l5i.4O3.07) 
mr io%.7S) 
(S1*t ,mt1) 
Ctto 
i w n s i i 
0227101 
0227002 
0230001 
Chonjo 
Amount i 
•12,104 J0 
DIopul* 
Amount 
30.00 
SO 00 
30.00 
I0.H I 
Prim or Lou Harris <lou@budget»tfah.com> 12/27| 
